1) Why a monarch ever needed Parliament
English (later British) monarchs once raised money by command. That broke down when wars and administration became too costly to fund from royal estates and feudal dues. Magna Carta (1215) was the first big check: the king should not levy extraordinary taxes without the “common counsel of the realm”, and he could not punish people without due process of law. Over the next two centuries, consent moved from a private council of nobles to a representative assembly of counties and towns (1265; regularised in 1295). By 1407, the Crown had accepted that money bills start in the Commons. The basic bargain was set: no money without consent, and grievances heard before taxes are granted. (Wikipedia)
Why mention this? Because it explains why the monarch’s hands are tied now. Parliament exists to authorise money and laws on behalf of those who pay and obey them.
2) “Law over the king,” not “king over the law”
By the seventeenth century, a direct clash developed: was the king the source of law (rex, lex), or was the king under law (lex, rex)? Judges such as Sir Edward Coke insisted that cases must be decided by the reasoning of the law, not by royal will. Parliament followed through in the Petition of Right (1628) against taxation without consent, and after the 1688 Revolution, the Bill of Rights (1689) made it explicit: the Crown cannot suspend laws, dispense with laws, or raise money without Parliament. The monarch would still reign, but would do so under law and with Parliament, not above it. (Avalon Project)
3) What powers the monarch has now (in practice, not just on paper)
From the 18th to the 20th century, real executive power shifted to ministers who must keep the confidence of the House of Commons. The monarch’s remaining powers are formal and are almost always used on the advice of the Prime Minister:
- Appointing a Prime Minister. In practice, the King appoints who can command a Commons majority.
- Royal Assent. No bill has been refused assent since Queen Anne vetoed the Scottish Militia Bill in 1708; assent is now treated as a formality. (Parliament News)
- Opening, proroguing and dissolving Parliament. These are done on ministerial advice. Since the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022, the Prime Minister may request a dissolution at any time within the five-year limit; the expectation is that the monarch grants the request. The Act also contains an “ouster clause” that keeps courts from reviewing a dissolution decision. (Legislation.gov.uk)
Courts will, however, step in if the government uses prerogative in a way that frustrates Parliament. In 2019, the Supreme Court held that the government’s attempt to prorogue Parliament was unlawful because it prevented Parliament from doing its job. That ruling dealt with prorogation, not dissolution, but it shows there are limits when executive action undermines Parliament. (Supreme Court UK)
4) The key question: Can the King dissolve an “unsatisfactory” Parliament?
Short answer: no — not on his own initiative. The monarch does not sit in judgement on Parliament’s merits and cannot dissolve it simply because it is “unsatisfactory.” Dissolution today is a Prime Ministerial request, and the King is expected to accept that request.
Is refusal ever possible? There is a narrow, old convention known as the Lascelles Principles (1950). They say a monarch might refuse a PM’s request only if:
- the existing Parliament is still “vital, viable and capable of doing its job”;
- an immediate election would harm the national economy; and
- the monarch could find another PM who could govern with a working majority for a reasonable period.
Even these criteria are not law; they are guidance from a different era. Modern practice, reflected in official explanations and non-partisan briefings, is that a monarch almost never refuses a dissolution request. If a PM asks, a dissolution is granted — unless there is a very clear and workable alternative government ready to take over at once. In short, the monarch’s personal discretion is extremely limited. (House of Commons Library)
Two practical points follow:
- If a PM loses the confidence of the House and cannot find a majority, the King’s first step is not to dissolve at will but to see whether someone else can form a government. Only if no-one can, would a dissolution follow — on advice.
- If a PM with a majority asks for a dissolution, the King would grant it. Refusing in those circumstances would trigger a political and constitutional crisis, which is precisely what the modern monarchy is designed to avoid.
5) Accountability for spending: mostly after the event
Large commitments are usually authorised by a government that controls the Commons timetable. The strongest public checks tend to come after the money is already committed:
- The National Audit Office (NAO) audits accounts and value for money;
- the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) holds hearings; and
- the Infrastructure & Projects Authority (IPA) monitors major projects.
These are valuable, but they are after the fact.
That is why problems like HS2, Horizon, and even Chilcot feel like accountability after the damage — and the bills are huge:
- HS2. Phase 1’s forecast has climbed to £49–£56.6 billion (2019 prices). Cancelling the northern leg (Phase 2) generated £2.17 billion in one-off charges in 2023/24, with up to £100 million more to wind down and remediate sites through 2027; scaling back Euston alone wrote off £150 million+. (House of Commons Library; Financial Times)
- Post Office / Horizon. By 29 Aug 2025, government figures show £1.176 billion paid to 8,600+ claimants. In addition, £100.3 million has been spent on legal/administration costs for the redress schemes, plus £42.1 million in claimant legal/professional fees covered by the state (to 30 Jun 2025). (GOV.UK)
- Chilcot (Iraq Inquiry). Far smaller in cash terms, but still £13 million+ to examine decisions taken years earlier — a textbook example of scrutiny after the fact. (House of Commons Library)
Sources (short): House of Commons Library briefings on HS2 and the Iraq Inquiry; Financial Times coverage of HS2 cancellation/wind-down costs; GOV.UK updates on Horizon compensation and scheme costs.
The OBR — what it does, and what it can’t do
- The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) is an independent fiscal watchdog. It produces the official economic and fiscal forecasts, checks whether the government is meeting its fiscal rules, and scrutinises policy costings at Budgets.
- It does not approve or veto policies, cannot stop a Chancellor, and does not audit projects — that is NAO/PAC territory. When ministers sideline it (as happened before the 2022 “mini-budget”), markets and Parliament lose a shared scoreboard.
- Plain English: the OBR is your speedometer, not your brake.
6) Why some people worry about this arrangement
In 1976, Lord Hailsham warned that the UK can turn into an “elective dictatorship”: once a party has a solid Commons majority, there are few hard limits. Unlike countries with written constitutions and constitutional courts, UK courts will not strike down Acts of Parliament, the Lords cannot veto money bills, and the monarch acts on advice. The 2019 prorogation case shows there are legal boundaries, but inside Parliament a strong majority can legislate very quickly. (Wikipedia)
That leads to a simple conclusion. The monarchy is not a safety valve against a dominant government. It provides continuity and neutrality, not an emergency brake. If you want a brake, it has to be built inside Parliament and the wider constitution.
7) So what reforms make sense — and why?
Because the monarch is not the solution to an “unsatisfactory” Parliament, any remedy must be parliamentary. Practical areas often proposed:
- Write the rules down. If a Prime Minister wants to ask the King to end Parliament early and call an election, they should first win a quick confidence vote in the House of Commons. During the election period, publish clear caretaker rules so everyone knows the government won’t make big policy changes, major appointments, or sign large contracts unless it’s absolutely necessary.
- Stronger scrutiny before big constitutional or fiscal moves. Require pre-legislative committee scrutiny and a short cooling-off period for major constitutional bills and very large spending commitments.
- Guardrails on prorogation. In 2019 the Supreme Court said the government can’t suspend (prorogue) Parliament in a way that stops it doing its job. Parliament could now pass a simple law to tighten this: any suspension should be limited to a short, fixed period unless MPs vote to approve a longer break.
- Reinforce the Commons’ money powers with transparency. Keep “the Commons controls supply,” but add independent costings and impact statements for major programmes before second reading, so MPs — and the public — see the trade-offs clearly.
- A better second look. Whether by strengthening the Lords’ revision role or reforming it, the aim is more thorough line-by-line checking without routine gridlock.
- Make the OBR unavoidable at Budgets. Require an OBR forecast for any fiscally significant package and let the OBR publish independently if ministers refuse to commission it.
How others add brakes (why the UK can feel worse)
- Germany: a Federal Constitutional Court that can stop laws, and a constitutional debt brake with legal force; proportional elections that spread power.
- France: a Constitutional Council that reviews laws before they take effect; a strong audit court (Cour des comptes) and a high council that checks the government’s budget assumptions.
We have useful institutions, but they are mostly after-the-event, and the monarch cannot fix that.
8) A brief personal reflection
In 1980, a German friend told me he admired Britain as the “Mother of Parliaments.” I understood why: our system put law above the ruler and Parliament above personal will. I now think the belief that we have the best democracy is false. Countries like Germany and France have stronger checks and balances: courts that can stop bad laws, fiscal rules with legal teeth, and budget institutions that test assumptions before the money goes out of the door. We, by design, rely on a government’s self-restraint, a watchdog that explains but cannot veto, and inquiries that arrive after the damage. That is not the best system; it is an exposed one.
Bottom line
- Could the King dissolve an “unsatisfactory” Parliament? No — not on his own. He dissolves on the Prime Minister’s request, and refusal would be rare and only in very specific conditions (Lascelles Principles), which almost never apply in practice. (House of Commons Library)
- So where should reform focus? Not on the Crown — and not on trusting ministers to police themselves. If we want consent to be real, we need binding brakes that sit outside day-to-day government control, trigger automatically, and give independent bodies teeth.
Why this, not royal intervention? The monarchy provides continuity and neutrality, not an emergency brake. Effective checks must be hard-wired into parliamentary procedure and law, with independent publication rights (OBR), pre-commitment gates (NAO/IPA), and automatic triggers that do not depend on whoever holds a majority. As things stand, the bargain often fails: scrutiny usually happens ex post, after the money has gone. The proposals above are about restoring the original deal—no money without prior consent and scrutiny before commitment. In other words, move the hard checks from after the event to before it.
